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Abstract. We analyse games of greenhouse gas emission reduction in which the emissions and
the emission reduction costs of one country depend on other countries’ emission abatement. In an
analytically tractable model, we show that international trade effects on costs and emissions can
either increase or decrease incentives to reduce emissions and to cooperate on emission abatement;
in some specifications, optimal emission reduction is unaffected by trade. We therefore specify the
model further, calibrating it to larger models that estimate the costs of emission reduction, trade
effects, and impacts of climate change. If trade effects are driven by total emission reduction costs
of other countries cooperation is slightly more difficult than in the case without trade effects. If trade
effects are determined by relative emission reduction efforts in other countries, cooperation becomes
easier. Carbon leakage does not affect our qualitative insights, although it does change the numbers.
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1. Introduction
Climate change is a complex problem with many interactions between countries.
The main interactions take place, of course, via the atmosphere. However, national
emission reduction policies also influence each other via international trade and
investment. Other interactions include those between climate policy and tech-
nology, development, nature conservation, environmental protection, and transport.
Climate change research only slowly comes to grips with this complexity. This
paper explores the interactions between emission reduction strategies and trade
effects.
Most game theoretic analyses of international climate policy allow for one inter-
action only: the climate. In those analyses, greenhouse gas emission reduction is
a private good while the atmosphere is a public good. However, this is a distorted
representation of reality. Greenhouse gas emission reduction in one country affects
other countries in more ways than just via climatic change, particularly via inter-
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national trade and investment, carbon leakage, and technological development
and diffusion. This paper investigates international climate policy with multiple
interactions.
Obviously, other authors have realised this as well. The impacts of international
trade on the distribution of the costs of climate change are analysed by, amongst
others, Bernstein et al. (1999a–c) and Kemfert (2000). The literature on interna-
tional cooperation and trade is thin, however; see Ioannidis et al. (2000) for a
recent review of the international environmental agreement literature. Copeland
and Taylor (2000) look at the demand for unilateral emission reduction in a CGE
model with international trade in goods as well as emission permits. Le Breton and
Soubayran (1997) investigate second-best environmental policies in the presence of
international trade. Feenstra (1999) looks at international trade and environmental
dumping. Barrett (1997) looks at trade sanctions as a deterrent to free-riding. Alpay
(2000) shows under which conditions trade can stimulate environmental protection
with the help of general equilibrium model with a game theoretic component. We
focus on the question how international trade (a) changes optimal emission reduc-
tion and (b) incentives to cooperate on emission reduction. As far as we know, we
are the first to do so.
Whether an agreement can be reached depends on the opportunities to reduce
conflicts of interests; a bargaining situation contains opportunities to collaborate
for mutual benefits (Barrett 1994). As real negotiation processes demonstrate, an
agreement between all players is unlikely. It is more realistic that some players act
unilaterally in order to maximise their own welfare, while other players form small
coalitions. The conclusion that stable coalitions are small has been established for
single-issue international environmental negotiations (Barrett 1994; Botteon and
Carraro 1997a, b, 1998; Carraro and Siniscalco 1992, 1993; Hoel 1994). Carraro
and Siniscalco (1997), Katsoulacos (1996) and Tol et al. (2000, 2001) investigate
whether linking international greenhouse gas emission reduction policy and tech-
nology policy would enlarge incentives for cooperation. This paper does not link
issues, but analyses the case with dual interactions between players, only one of
which (greenhouse gas emissions) is actively managed. Here, the second interac-
tion is trade. In Tol et al. (2000, 2001), the second interaction is technology. Barrett
(1994) confines himself to trade sanctions as a deterrent to free riding. Botteon and
Carraro (1997a, b, 1998) confine themselves to carbon leakage.
This paper looks at the effects of international trade and investment and
carbon leakage on incentives to abate greenhouse gas emissions and incentives
to cooperate on emission reduction. Because of international trade effects, the cost
of one country’s emission reduction depends on other countries’ abatement efforts
and costs. Because of carbon leakage, one country’s emissions depend on other
countries’ abatement effort. Section 2 takes an analytical viewpoint. We demon-
strate that most relationships of interest are ambiguous – particularly, the effects
of international trade and investment on costs and emissions can both increase
and decrease a country’s incentives to abate emissions and to cooperate with other
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countries in doing so. Therefore, we introduce a numerical model in Section 3.
This is an intertemporal computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the world
economy, designed to answer empirical questions about greenhouse gas emission
reduction, international trade and carbon leakage. A simplified version of the model
of Section 2 is calibrated to the outcomes of the CGE model. The simple model is
used in Section 4. It is analytically tractable and, fully parameterised, used to shed
light on the ambiguities of Section 2. Section 5 concludes.
2. Analytical Structure
For convenience, we consider only two countries, labelled as {i, j}, with i = j .
The case with more countries will be introduced below. Let Ci denote the absolute
costs of greenhouse gas emission reduction in country i. Suppose
Ci
Yi
= Ci(Ri, Rj , Cj )
Yi
= fi(Ri) + gi(Ri − Rj) + hi(Cj ) (1)
where R denotes emission reduction (as a fraction of uncontrolled emissions
without leakage), and Y is GDP. The cost function consists of three components:
the costs of domestic emission reduction f (.), costs associated with the difference
between domestic and foreign emission reduction g(.), and costs associated with
foreign emission reduction costs h(.). The g(.) function combines the terms-of-
trade effect and the dynamic effects of the international capital market. These
effects are driven by the domestic prices of energy and energy-intensive goods,
which differ in different countries because of differences in regulation. The h(.)
functions measures all other effects, particularly a slowing of economic growth
in the other country.1 To put it differently, g(.) captures the relative effects, and
h(.) the size effects of international emission reduction policy; together, g(.) and
h(.) capture the spillover effects; f (.) captures the domestic effects. Additivity is
assumed for convenience.
Let
fi(0) = 0, fi(x) > 0 if x > 0, ∂fi
∂x
> 0,
∂2fi
∂x2
> 0. (2)
That is, the costs of domestic emission reduction are positive, increasing and
convex. The baseline (R = 0) is optimal. These are standard assumptions for the
costs of greenhouse gas emission reduction.
Let
gi(0) = 0, gi(x) > 0 if x > 0, gi(x) < 0 if x < 0, ∂gi
∂x
> 0. (3)
That is, if country i and j abate the same amount, there are no additional costs
or benefits to country i; note that this is only strictly true if the two countries are
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identical; in the analysis below, however, only the slope of g matters. If country j
abates less than does country i, country i suffers additional costs. The additional
costs or benefits grow with the difference in abatement effort. In a simple trade
model, g and x may actually differ in sign; that is, assumption (3) is not met. More
expensive energy in one country would simply change its terms-of-trade, for better
or worse. In a more realistic model, where specialisations do not change overnight,
taxing energy while other countries do not, would entail a loss. The empirical
estimates in Section 4 confirm this suspicion. However, for completeness, we also
analyse the case in which g and x differ in sign.
Let
hi(0) = 0, hi(x) > 0 if x > 0, ∂hi
∂x
> 0. (4)
That is, if country j faces positive emission reduction costs, some of those costs
trickle down to country i, for example, through reduced exports from i to j. The
larger the costs to country j, the larger the effect on country i. This size effect
has particularly been documented for developing countries, which, despite a fall in
world oil prices and an improvement of their terms-of-trade, are generally found to
loose from greenhouse gas emission abatement in the OECD.
Although the model (1)–(4) is fairly simple, it covers the relevant effects. Let us
reiterate the basic properties. Emission reduction is costly. If a country has a more
stringent emission reduction policy than others, that country faces additional costs
because of worsening terms-of-trade. Vice versa, if a country’s policy is less strin-
gent, its terms-of-trade improve. If a country reduces emissions, it grows slower
and imports less, inflicting losses on other countries. Babiker et al. (2000), Bern-
stein et al. (1999a–c), Kennedy et al. (1996, 1997), Piggott et al. (1992), Tulpule et
al. (1999) and Whalley and Wigle (1991) discuss the relative size of these effects
for different economies and different emission reduction policies.
The model (1)–(4) displays a wide range of behaviour. The costs of emission
reduction depend on the emission reduction in other countries. This effect can be
positive or negative, depending on the relative sizes of the above mechanisms and
the relative sizes of emission reduction. Even in the absence of domestic action,
a country can be affected (positively or negatively) by other countries’ emission
reduction (e.g., Babiker et al. 2000; Tulpule et al. 1999).
The model is completed with carbon emissions and carbon leakage Let
ERi = (1 − Ri)Ei + ki(Rj − Ri)Ei. (5)
That is, actual emissions ERi depend on the emissions without climate policy Ei
and emission reductions in both countries.2 Note that R now denotes emission
reductions in the absence of leakage, or perhaps “intended emission reduction”.
With leakage, actual emission reduction may be different. Let
ki(0) = 0, ki(x) > 0 if x > 0, ki(x) < 0 if x < 0, ∂ki
∂x
> 0. (6)
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Thus, emissions increase in country i if country j abates more than does country i.
That is, there is leakage from j to i. Vice versa, if country i abates more than does
country j, its emissions leak from i to j. Leakage only replaces emissions,3 so that
k1(R2 − R1)E1 + k2(R1 − R2)E2 = 0. (7)
The benefits of avoided climate change Bi are given by
Bi = li(Ei + Ej) − li (ERi + ERj ). (8)
We only assume that B is strictly increasing in total emissions; there are no further
restrictions on function li(.). The optimisation problem is then to minimise the net
costs, that is Ci − Bi , where the level of emission reduction Ri is the only control
variable.
There are a number of possibilities to – logically – extend this framework to n
players. This paper mainly uses the following extension:
Ci = fi(Ri) + gi(R1, R2, . . . , Ri, . . . , Rn) +
hi(C1, C2, . . . , Ci−1, Ci+1, . . . , Cn) (1′)
ERi = [1 − Ri + ki(R1, R2, . . . , Ri, . . . , Rn)]Ei. (5′)
Equation (8) would be replaced by
Bi = li
(
n∑
s=1
Es
)
− li
(
n∑
s=1
ERs
)
. (8′)
The model can be solved by considering the first order condition (FOC), which can
be represented by matrices; we need to use matrix inversion or Cramer’s ruler to
get an explicit expression. We do this for the three dimensional case in Section 4.
The effect of spillover and leakage effects on optimal emission reduction is
ambiguous, as can be seen from the FOC for the case with two players. For
player 1,(
∂f1
∂R1
+ ∂g1
∂R1
− ∂h1
∂C2
∂g2
∂R1
)/(
1 − ∂h1
∂C2
∂h2
∂C1
)
=
E1
∂l1
∂R1
+ ∂l1
∂R1
(
E1
∂k1
∂R1
− E2 ∂k2
∂R1
)
(9)
and similar for player 2; in (9), the marginal costs are at the left hand side and the
marginal benefits at the right hand side. Recall that leakage is just replacement,
that is, the emissions of player 1 (2) go up by the same amount as the emissions of
player 2 (1) go down. Then the benefits and the marginal benefits are unaffected,
that is, the rightmost term of (9) cancels.
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Assume, for the moment, that the emission reduction and emission reduction
costs of the other country are fixed. Let us first consider the terms-of-trade effect
only, that is, h = 0:
∂f1
∂R1
+ ∂g1
∂R1
= E1 ∂l1
∂R1
. (9′)
Even though this terms-of-trade effect can be either positive or negative, the costs
at the margin are always positive, that is, ∂g1/∂R1 > 0, so that optimal emission
reduction is lower with terms-of-trade effects than without. Note that if leakage
does not cancel in aggregate – that is, Equation (7) does not hold – then the optimal
emission reduction can be both lower and higher. Obviously, in the (unlikely) case
that ∂g1/∂R1 < 0, this conclusion is reversed – but still unambiguous, unless
leakage does not cancel.
Now consider the case with size effects but without terms-of-trade effects, that
is, g = 0:(
∂f1
∂R1
)/(
1 − ∂h1
∂C2
∂h2
∂C1
)
= E1 ∂l1
∂R1
. (9′′)
In this case, the marginal costs are the same with and without the size effects and
optimal emission reduction is unaltered, as the partial derivatives with respect to
Ci are not sensitive to changes in Ri . Leakage, if it does not cancel, could drive
optimal emission reduction up or down.
Finally, consider the case with both size and terms-of-trade effects. The terms-
of-trade effects still work towards lowering of optimal emission reduction. The size
effects are no longer neutral. The third term of the left-hand-side of (9) has an effect
opposite to the effect of the second term. The combined effect is ambiguous. If we
assume that the countries are similar – g1 = g2 – what matters is whether ∂h1/∂C2
is greater or smaller than unity:(
∂f1
∂R1
+ ∂g1
∂R1
[
1 − ∂h1
∂C2
])/(
1 − ∂h1
∂C2
∂h2
∂C1
)
= E1 ∂l1
∂R1
. (9′′′)
If it is smaller, size and terms-of-trade effects work towards lower emission reduc-
tion, albeit it is to a lesser extent than without the size effects. If it is greater,
size and terms-of-trade effects lead to a greater optimal emission reduction. The
strength of the marginal size effect depends, obviously, on emission reduction.
Therefore, for small emission reduction, size effects lower emission reduction even
further; for large emission reduction, size effects have the opposite effect. Leakage,
if it does not cancel, only makes the matter more indeterminate.
Now, if we consider that emission reductions and emission reduction costs are
set simultaneously for both countries, the ambiguities of (9) only increase.
So, based on a formal model alone, one cannot say whether spillover effects lead
to higher or lower emission reduction, higher or lower emission reduction costs,
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Table I. Regions in WAGEM
Abbreviation Countries
ASIA India, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan
CHN China
CNA Canada, New Zealand and Australia
EU15 European Union
JPN Japan
LSA Latin America
MIDE Middle East and North Africa
REC Russia, Eastern and Central European Countries
ROW Rest of the World
SSA Sub Saharan Africa
USA United States of America
and thus whether trade effects help or hinder cooperation. The answer depends
on the relative strength of the various effects. In the next section, we estimate
the effects using a state-of-the-art model for analysing carbon dioxide emission
reduction costs, international trade and international investment.
3. CGE
The pay-offs of international emission reduction policies are estimated using an
intertemporal general equilibrium model WAGEM (Kemfert 2000). General equi-
librium models are especially appropriate to assess economic impacts of alternative
climate policy games, see Manne and Richels (1998), Nordhaus and Yang (1998),
Bernstein et al. (1999a–c) or McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999). WAGEM is an inter-
temporal computable general equilibrium and multi regional trade model for the
global economy. The model considers 11 world regions (Table I) that are linked
through bilateral sectoral trade flows based on GTAP data of 1995. For each region,
a representative agent maximises lifetime utility from consumption. This deter-
mines the level of savings. Firms choose investment in order to make the most of
the present value of their companies.
In each region, production of the non-energy macro good is captured by an
aggregate production function. The production function characterises technology
through transformation possibilities on the output side and substitution possibi-
lities on the input side. In each region, a representative household chooses to
allocate lifetime income across consumption in different time periods in order
to maximise lifetime utility. In each period, households face the choice between
current consumption and future consumption, which can be purchased via savings.
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The trade-off between current consumption and savings is given by a constant inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution. Producers invest as long as the marginal return
on investment equals the marginal cost of capital formation. The rates of return are
determined by a uniform and endogenous world interest rate such that the marginal
productivity of a unit of investment and a unit of consumption is equalised within
and across countries. Domestic and imported varieties for the non-energy good for
all buyers in the domestic market are treated as imperfect substitutes by a CBS
Armington aggregation function, constrained to constant elasticities of substitu-
tion. Emission limits can be reached by domestic action or by trading emission
permits within Annex B countries allocated initially due to regional commitment
targets. Those countries meeting the Kyoto emissions reduction target stabilise
their mitigated emissions at 2010 level.
Fourteen scenarios are run with WAGEM to get an idea of the costs of carbon
dioxide emission reduction. We consider only emission reduction by the European
Union (EU15), Japan (JPN) and the USA. In one scenario, all three countries
reduce emissions by 10% in comparison to the base year emissions (1990). In three
scenarios, two countries reduce their emissions by 10% while the other countries
do not reduce at all. In three further scenarios, one country reduces its emissions by
10% while the other countries do not abate emissions. This is repeated for a 20%
emission reduction. This makes 14 scenarios:
All: All Annex B countries reduce emissions by 20% (10%)
EUuni: EU15 reduces emissions unilaterally by 20% (10%)
Japuni: JPN reduces emissions unilaterally by 20% (10%)
Usuni: USA reduces emissions unilaterally by 20% (10%)
EUJap: EU15 and JPN reduce emissions bilaterally by 20% (10%)
EUUS: EU15 and USA reduce emissions bilaterally by 20% (10%)
JapUS: JPN and USA reduce emissions bilaterally by 20% (10%)
Table II summarises the results.
Table II also decomposes the overall welfare effects. The domestic effect
measures the costs of emission abatement if the region were autarkic. The inter-
national effects cover the rest, including terms-of-trade and size effects. The inter-
national effects are predominantly positive for the USA, predominantly negative
for the EU15, while JPN shows a mixed picture.
4. Simple Model
The CGE has 11 regions, but only 3 reduce their emissions: the EU15, JPN and
the USA. So, we consider a game with 3 players. The other 8 regions are dummy
players, playing a default strategy of zero emission reduction.
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Table II. Emission reduction in 2010 (relative to 1990), income loss in 2010 (relative to business as
usual), and the decomposition of income loss in domestic and international effects
Emission reduction (%) Loss of income (%) Domestic International
USA EU15 JPN USA EU15 JPN USA EU15 JPN USA EU15 JPN
10 10 10 0.00 0.72 0.15 0.21 0.19 0.06 –0.21 0.52 0.10
0 10 0 –0.72 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 –0.72 0.02 0.00
0 0 10 –0.57 0.02 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.06 –0.78 0.02 0.17
10 0 0 0.35 0.14 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.00
0 10 10 –0.45 0.18 0.19 0.00 0.19 0.06 –0.45 –0.01 0.13
10 10 0 0.54 0.22 0.00 0.21 0.19 0.00 –0.33 0.03 0.00
10 0 10 0.19 0.02 0.19 0.21 0.00 0.06 –0.02 0.02 0.13
20 20 20 1.01 0.75 0.54 0.58 0.47 0.23 0.43 0.28 0.31
0 20 0 –0.58 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.00 –0.58 0.26 0.00
0 0 20 –0.47 0.04 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.23 –0.47 0.04 0.38
20 0 0 0.93 0.54 –0.04 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.54 –0.04
0 20 20 –0.51 0.70 0.58 0.00 0.47 0.23 –0.51 0.22 0.35
20 20 0 0.97 0.73 –0.08 0.58 0.47 0.00 0.39 0.26 –0.08
20 0 20 0.95 0.07 0.50 0.58 0.00 0.23 0.37 0.07 0.27
4.1. NO LEAKAGE: MODEL
We fit two specifications to the outcomes of the CGE, both with two variants. Both
specifications simplify (1). Note that running a CGE as complicated as WAGEM
is time consuming. We therefore only have a limited number of “observations”.
Note also that WAGEM is but one of many CGEs for this type of analysis. We
therefore opted for sensitivity analyses rather than improving the response surface
of WAGEM.
Because of the strong correlation between emission reduction and emission
reduction costs, we cannot reliably estimate a function similar to (1), that is, not
with the number of observations available – see Table III. For the same reason, the
goodness of fit is about the same for both simplifications. We cannot say which is
a better approximation to the CGE results.
The first formulation (T1) is as follows. The costs of emission reduction are
given by (10), for player 1, with f (x) = αx2, g(y) = χy and h(z) = 0.
C1
Y1
= α1R21 + χ1(R1 − 0.5R2 − 0.5R3) (10)
and similar for players 2 and 3. A more general version (T1′) of (10) is
C1
Y1
= α1R21 + χ11R1 + χ12R2 + χ13R3. (10′)
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Table III. Parameter estimatesa
αi βi χi χi1 χi2 χi3 R2
JPN NT 0.142 0.983
(0.006)
(14) T2 0.148 0.076 0.991
(0.005) (0.023)
(10) T1 0.133 0.003 0.990
(0.005) (0.001)
T1&2 0.143 0.052 0.001 0.991
(0.012) (0.054) (0.003)
(10′)b T1′ 0.057 0.017 –0.000 –0.003 1.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 0.986
(16′) T2′ 0.151 –0.015 –0.002 0.991
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
USA NT 0.244 0.809
(0.048)
(14) T2 0.351 0.949 0.907
(0.048) (0.282)
(10) T1 0.159 0.032 0.913
(0.042) (0.009)
T1&2 0.239 0.020 0.430 0.919
(0.102) (0.016) (0.498)
(10′)b T1′ 0.149 –0.018 0.033 –0.016 0.968
(0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 0.737
(16′) T2′ 0.312 –0.074 –0.080 0.890
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
EU15 NT 0.191 0.721
(0.026)
(14) T2 0.182 –0.169 0.758
(0.026) (0.136)
(10) T1 0.215 –0.009 0.768
(0.030) (0.006)
T1&2 0.207 –0.007 –0.056 0.769
(0.045) (0.010) (0.216)
(10′)b T1′ 0.123 –0.000 0.012 0.008 0.931
(0.018) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 0.521
(16′) T2′ 0.164 –0.007 0.061 0.813
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
aStandard deviations are given in parentheses.
bThe parameters of Equation (10′) are estimated separately. The domestic effect is used to estimate
α; the R2 is in the top row; the international effects of Table II are used to estimate the χs; the R2 is
in the bottom row.
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The properties of (10) and (10′) are very similar. However, we cannot reliably
estimate the parameters of (10′). Therefore, we estimate the parameters of Equation
(10′) separately. The αs are estimated from the domestic effects in Table II; the
χs are estimated from the international effects in Table II. See Table III for the
results.
The benefits of emission reduction are given by
B1
Y1
= γ1(R1E1 + R2E2 + R3E3). (11)
That is, benefits of emission reduction depend linearly on the avoided emissions in
all three regions.
The first order condition for non-cooperative behaviour is, for player 1
2α1Y1R1 + χ1Y1 − γ1E1Y1 = 0 ⇔ R1 = γ1E1 − χ12α1 . (12)
In this formulation, the marginal costs of emission reduction, and hence the optimal
emission abatement, are not affected by emission reduction in other regions. The
optimum, however, does shift if χ1 = 0. If we use (10′) instead of (10), (12)
would not be affected if χ1 = χ11. We argue above that χ1 > O, so that
non-cooperative optimal emission reduction falls. The reason is straightforward.
Increasing emission control relative to other regions would increase costs by
worsening terms-of-trade. Of course, if χ1 < 0, the argument is reversed. We
estimate χ1 below.
The first order condition for cooperative behaviour is, for player 1
2α1Y1R1 + χ1Y1 − 0.5χ2Y2 − 0.5χ3Y3 − (γ1Y1 + γ2Y2 + γ3Y3)E1 = 0 ⇔
R1 = (γ1Y1 + γ2Y2 + γ3Y3)E1 − χ1Y1 + 0.5χ2Y2 + 0.5χ3Y32α1Y1 . (13)
The marginal costs of emission reduction are independent of the spillover effects,
but the regions do take the welfare effect in other regions into account. If we use
(10′) instead of (10), (12) would not be affected if χ1 = χ11, 0.5χ2 = −χ21, and
0.5χ3 = −χ31. The impact of spillover effects on cooperative emission control
is ambiguous as it depends on whether 0.5χ2Y2 + 0.5χ3Y3 − χ1Y1 is positive or
negative.
As the effect of spillover effects on cooperative emission control is ambiguous,
so is the effect on incentives to cooperate. Therefore, we turn to empirical estimates
of the parameters of (10).
In the second formulation (T2), the costs of emission reduction are given by
(14), with f (x) = αx2, g(x) = 0 and h(z) = βz:
C1
Y1
= α1R21 + β1
(
C2 + C3
Y2 + Y3
)
. (14)
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That is, costs of emission reduction depend on domestic emission reduction and
the costs of emission reduction in the other regions.
Equation (14) has to be rewritten:


1 − β1Y1
Y2 + Y3 −
β1Y1
Y2 + Y3
− β2Y2
Y1 + Y3 1 −
β2Y2
Y1 + Y3
− β3Y3
Y1 + Y2 −
β3Y3
Y1 + Y2 1



 C1C2
C3

 =


α1R
2
1Y1
α2R
2
2Y2
α3R
2
3Y3

 (15)
or, in matrix form,
C = A−1D (16)
where C is the vector of total emission reduction costs, D the vector of domestic
emission reduction costs, and A is the parameter matrix as in (15). Estimating (16)
is not easy because of parameter restrictions, and because our data set is too limited
to apply methods like 2SLS and 3SLS (e.g., Greene 1991). We proceed by two
alternative routes. First, we estimate Equation (14) directly, ignoring problems of
endogeneity. Second, we estimate an unrestricted version (T2′) of (16), that is:
C1
Y1
= α11R21 + χ12R22 + χ13R23. (16′)
Equation (16′) has 9 parameters, while Equation (16) has only 6. Note that the two
alternative ways of estimation lead to approximately the same conclusions (see
below).
Summarising, the following forms of Equation (1) are used:
fi(Ri) = αiR2i all cases
gi(Ri, Rj , Rk) =


0
χi(Ri − 12Rj − 12Rk)
χiiRi + χijRj + χikRk
NT, T2, T2′
T1, T1 + 2
T1′
hi(Cj , Ck) =


0
βi
(
Cj + Ck
Yj + Yk
)
χijR
2
j + χikR2k
NT, T1, T1′
T2, T1 + 2
T2′
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Subtracting the benefits – Equation (8) – the objective function becomes:
W = C − B = A−1D − B. (17)
Without cooperation, optimal emission control follows from solving:
max
R1
(1 0 0) (A−1D − B)
max
R2
(0 1 0) (A−1D − B) (18)
max
R3
(0 0 1) (A−1D − B)
With cooperation, optimal emission control follows from solving
max
R1,R2,R3
(1 1 1) (A−1D − B). (19)
The first order conditions of (18) are, for player 1
(1 0 0)


1 − β1Y1
Y2 + Y3 −
β1Y1
Y2 + Y3
− β2Y2
Y1 + Y3 1 −
β2Y2
Y1 + Y3
− β3Y3
Y1 + Y2 −
β3Y3
Y1 + Y2 1


−1

 2α1R1Y10
0

−
(1 0 0)


γ1E1Y1
γ2E2Y2
γ3E3Y3

 = 0 (20) (20)
which “simplifies” to
1 + β2Y2
Y1 + Y3
β3Y3
Y1 + Y2
1 − β2Y2
Y1 + Y3
β3Y3
Y1 + Y2 +
β1Y1
Y2 + Y3
[
β2Y2
Y1 + Y3
(
2
β3Y3
Y1 + Y2 + 1
)
+ β3Y3
Y1 + Y2
]2α1R1 = γ1E1 (20′)
and similar for players 2 and 3. So, the spillover effects do affect non-cooperative
optimal emission reduction, because the solution of (18) would be very different
if the βs were zero. However, the optimal emission reduction in one region is
independent of other regions’ actions. Spillover effects also affect welfare in
the optimum. These effects are ambiguous, depending on the interplay of the
parameters in the inverted matrix, as is clear from (20′).
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The first order conditions of (19) are, for emission reductions by player 1
(1 1 1)


1 − β1Y1
Y2 + Y3 −
β1Y1
Y2 + Y3
− β2Y2
Y1 + Y3 1 −
β2Y2
Y1 + Y3
− β3Y3
Y1 + Y2 −
β3Y3
Y1 + Y2 1


−1

 2α1R1Y10
0

−
(1 1 1)


γ1E1Y1
γ2E2Y2
γ3E3Y3

 = 0 (21)
which “simplifies” to
1 + β2Y2
Y1 + Y3 +
β3Y3
Y1 + Y2 +
β2Y2
Y1 + Y3
β3Y3
Y1 + Y2
1 − β2Y2
Y1 + Y3
β3Y3
Y1 + Y2 +
β1Y1
Y2 + Y3
[
β2Y2
Y1 + Y3
(
2
β3Y3
Y1 + Y2 + 1
)
+ β3Y3
Y1 + Y2
]2α1R1Y1 =
γ1E1Y1 + γ2E2Y2 + γ3E3Y3 (21′)
and similar for the emission reduction by players 2 and 3. The solution to (21)
would be different if the βs were zero, so the spillover effects affect cooperative
optimal emission reduction and hence the difference between non-cooperative and
cooperative action. Again, the effect is ambiguous, so that we turn to empirical
estimates of the parameters.
The two alternative formulations thus include different aspects of the spillover
effects. In the first formulation, trade effects are driven by the relative emission
abatement of one country compared to the others. In the second formulation, trade
effects are driven by the costs of emission abatement and thus, after some manipu-
lation, by the absolute emission abatement in other countries. Table III shows the
estimated parameters for the cases discussed above.
Of course, we can combine the two models, but then we lose sight on the
different aspects. Besides, the parameter estimates are insignificant in that case.
See Table III.
4.2. NO LEAKAGE: RESULTS
Table IV shows results of the two models presented above. Table V summarises the
findings. The parameters are estimated, using ordinary least squares because of data
limitations, from the outcomes of the CGE of the previous section. In addition, we
present the results of a model without any international trade interaction, calibrated
to the same CGE. See Table III.
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Table IV. Optimal emission reduction and pay-off without leakagea
USA EU15 JPN USA EU15 JPN
No cooperation
NT 7.0 4.9 4.7 25.8 31.3 35.1
(5.8–8.7) (4.3–5.7) (4.5–4.9) (22.5–30.4) (26.8–37.7) (30.0–42.3)
T1 0.6 6.5 3.7 32.9 13.3 18.4
(0.0–4.6) (4.4–9.3) (3.1–4.3) (27.4–41.5) (2.3–28.9) (5.5–38.1)
T1′ 11.4 7.6 11.6 39.3 31.8 48.3
(10.3–12.7) (6.7–8.9) (11.6–11.6) (12.9–70.5) (13.5–53.3) (41.2–57.2)
T2 5.1 5.5 4.5 20.2 27.4 30.2
(4.6–5.6) (4.9–6.1) (4.4–4.6) (19.4–20.6) (25.8–28.6) (27.2–32.9)
T2′ 5.3 5.7 4.4 28.6 24.8 18.4
(4.6–6.3) (4.9–6.9) (4.3–4.6) (22.7–32.5) (20.6–30.7) (16.0–21.8)
Full cooperation
NT 20.9 14.7 14.0 11.2 60.3 94.4
(17.5–26.0) (13.0–17.1) (13.5–14.6) (8.9–12.2) (51.0–74.3) (79.7–115.6)
T1 20.4 18.3 19.8 55.5 32.4 91.3
(15.1–29.6) (15.5–22.0) (15.6–23.6) (36.9–75.8) (28.8–46.3) (54.1–139.3)
T1′ 21.6 14.3 50.0 114.4 70.4 9.9
(11.4–34.3) (8.8–21.7) (50.0–50.0) (75.0–149.5) (22.5–133.3) (–39.9–73.5)
T2 11.4 9.8 29.6 0.5 81.5 3.9
(11.0–11.8) (9.8–9.8) (23.4–37.3) (0.6–2.7) (60.3–115.3) (–35.8–27.2)
T2′ 29.7 13.6 16.3 –95.4 38.5 40.8
(16.1–50.0) (10.3–19.8) (13.4–20.6) (–317.4–2.1) (27.0–78.5) (29.1–72.8)
Coalition of USA and EU15
NT 13.9 9.8 4.7 26.0 47.8 68.3
(11.6–17.3) (8.7–11.4) (4.6–4.9) (23.1–29.6) (40.4–58.7) (58.3–82.7)
T1 9.4 13.7 3.7 48.7 22.7 64.4
(6.4–14.8) (11.4–16.8) (3.1–4.3) (44.8–55.3) (11.7–39.0) (49.0–88.6)
T1′ 15.1 11.6 11.6 40.2 32.6 69.9
(7.3–24.9) (7.2–17.4) (11.6–11.6) (24.8–63.8) (9.1–69.4) (32.5–118.1)
T2 10.2 8.8 4.5 14.8 44.6 52.9
(9.9–10.5) (8.7–8.8) (4.4–4.6) (11.9–16.5) (41.4–48.7) (51.7–53.9)
T2′ 15.6 8.9 4.4 7.3 39.7 27.6
(10.3–32.8) (7.1–11.8) (4.3–4.6) (–118.6–17.5) (20.2–71.4) (21.7–45.6)
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Table IV. Continued
USA EU15 JPN USA EU15 JPN
Coalition of USA and JPN
NT 13.9 4.9 9.4 18.4 57.0 55.3
(11.6–17.3) (4.3–5.7) (9.0–9.7) (16.8–20.5) (48.8–69.0) (46.8–67.9)
T1 9.4 6.5 18.5 54.8 39.5 30.5
(6.3–14.8) (4.4–9.3) (16.8–19.9) (53.4–60.3) (36.6–49.3) (9.5–59.5)
T1′ 6.6 7.6 47.8 139.4 54.8 –47.6
(1.5–13.0) (6.7–8.9) (46.1–49.5) (90.6–194.9) (13.3–108.3) (–63.6–26.3)
T2 6.3 5.5 16.3 20.5 44.7 21.6
(5.7–6.8) (4.9–6.1) (14.4–17.9) (18.2–23.0) (40.7–48.6) (14.3–28.3)
T2′ 12.4 5.7 10.5 24.7 43.6 20.9
(9.6–17.5) (4.9–6.9) (9.5–11.9) (19.8–25.3) (30.8–67.1) (18.0–26.1)
Coalition of EU15 and JPN
NT 7.0 9.8 9.4 40.6 29.3 44.4
(5.8–8.7) (8.7–11.4) (9.0–9.7) (35.8–47.1) (25.4–35.0) (38.1–53.4)
T1 0.6 11.0 5.1 53.3 8.1 29.1
(0.0–4.6) (8.4–14.5) (6.9–3.1) (54.4–56.8) (–0.2–23.0) (14.1–50.2)
T1′ 11.4 7.3 31.3 86.2 49.2 14.8
(10.3–12.7) (3.9–11.8) (29.3–33.3) (33.0–155.5) (21.6–82.3) (6.0–27.3)
T2 6.3 7.2 21.7 19.0 51.7 11.6
(5.5–7.2) (6.3–8.4) (21.1–22.4) (9.6–24.8) (48.5–53.3) (8.3–15.8)
T2′ 29.7 11.7 9.0 57.8 21.8 33.7
(16.1–50.0) (9.2–15.9) (8.1–10.2) (38.4–96.9) (17.8–25.5) (27.4–44.8)
aThe range of emission reduction efforts and pay-offs are given in brackets. These ranges are found
by varying the parameters by one standard deviation.
We assume that the marginal costs of carbon dioxide emissions are $200/tC for
all three regions. This is high (cf. Tol 1999), but we need this to generate substantial
emission reductions.
Without trade interactions, except for the coalition between the USA and the
EU15, the grand coalition nor any of the three other possible coalitions of two
players is internally stable. That is, in each coalition, there is one player that
is better off in the non-cooperative case and thus has an incentive to leave the
coalition. This conclusion holds for the best guess as well as for the sensitivity
analyses.
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Table V. Stable coalitions without leakagea
NT T1 T1′ T2 T2′
Internal high Ø {USA, EU15} Ø Ø Ø
{USA, JPN}
mid {USA, EU15} {USA, EU15} {USA, EU15} Ø Ø
{USA, JPN}
low {USA, EU15} {USA, EU15} Ø Ø Ø
{USA, JPN}
Externalb high {EU15, JPN} {USA, JPN} {USA, EU15} {USA, EU15} Ø
{EU15, JPN} {EU15, JPN}
mid {EU15, JPN} {USA, JPN} {USA, EU15} {USA, EU15} {USA, JPN}
{EU15, JPN}
low {EU15, JPN} {USA, JPN} {USA, EU15} {USA, EU15} {USA, JPN}
{EU15, JPN}
Stable high Ø {USA, JPN} Ø Ø Ø
mid Ø {USA, JPN} {USA, EU15} Ø Ø
low Ø {USA, JPN} Ø Ø Ø
aStability based on the theory of cartel stability (Carraro et al. 1997):
Notation:
Pi(s) is the value of player i – who is not a member of s – for joining coalition s.
Qi(s) is the value of player i – who is not a member of s – for not joining coalition s.
Definition:
A coalition is internally stable iff: Pi(s) > Qi(s \ i) for all i ∈/ s.
A coalition is externally stable iff: Pi(s ∪ i) < Qi(s) for all i ∈ s.
A coalition is stable iff it is both internally and externally stable.
bThe grand coalition is externally stable by default.
In our first representation of trade interactions, the grand coalition is in the
γ -core, that is, all players are better off with full cooperation that with non-
cooperation. The grand coalition, however, is internally instable, using the myopic
stability criterion of Carraro: The EU15 is better of if it plays as a singleton, and
the USA and JPN form a coalition. The USA and JPN are better off in a coalition
than as singletons, so the grand coalition is also internally instable using the far-
sighted stability criterion of Chwe (1994). The EU15 does not want to from a
coalition with JPN alone, but it does with the USA. The USA and JPN would like
to form a coalition with the EU15, either of size 2 or 3. The grand coalition is not
stable in all sensitivity analyses. The coalition between the USA and the EUI5,
and the coalition between the USA and EU15 are internally stable in all sensitivity
analyses. The EU15 never wants to cooperate with JPN alone.
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A similar picture emerges for the alternative specification of (10′), and the
sensitivity analysis around its parameters. Full cooperation is unstable, but smaller
coalitions are viable, notably between the EU15 and the USA.
In our second representation of trade interactions, the grand coalition nor any
of the three possible coalitions of two players is internally stable. This holds for
the best guess as well as for the sensitivity analysis. It holds also for the alterna-
tive estimates of (16′), as well as the sensitivity analysis around its parameters.
Although we have difficulty estimating the parameters of (14) and (16′), the results
are robust against uncertainties in the estimates.
In sum, without trade effects, cooperation is hard to achieve. This is because
emission reduction is a public good. If we extend the model to include trade effects
driven by emission abatement in one country relative to emission abatement in
other countries, cooperation is easier. If instead trade effects are driven by total
emission abatement in other countries, cooperation is as difficult as without trade.
The intuition behind the last result is as follows. The fact that other players’ actions
have an additional impact on one’s pay-off, is an additional reason to want them to
cooperate. However, cooperation would also place additional demands on oneself.
In our case, the two effects approximately cancel, and this is true for a wide range
of parameter estimates. The intuition behind the second result is as follows. The
above reasoning still holds. However, if trade effects depend on relative actions,
then there is an additional reason for coordination.
4.3. LEAKAGE: MODEL
Above, we investigate the effects of international trade and investment on the costs
of emission reduction. International trade and investment also affect emissions, so-
called carbon leakage. We now add leakage to the model. Because the cost function
specification (10) and (10′) as well as (16) and (16′) behave much the same, we
restrict the attention to (10) and (16).
With leakage, Equation (11) has to be replaced with:
B1
Y1
= γ1{R1[(1 + k1)E1 − 0.5k2E2 − 0.5k3E3] +
R2[(1 + k2)E2 − 0.5k1E1 − 0.5k3E3] +
R3[(1 + k3)E3 − 0.5k1E1 − 0.5k2E2]} (22)
The first order condition for non-cooperative behaviour is, for player 1
2α1Y1R1 + χ1Y1 − γ1Y1[(1 + k1)E1 − 0.5k2E2 − 0.5k3E3] = 0 ⇔
R1 = γ1[(1 + k1)E1 − 0.5k2E2 − 0.5k3E3] − χ12α1 . (23)
Compared to the case without leakage (ki = 0), optimal emission reduction goes
up or down depending on the relative sizes of k and E. If economy 1 is relatively
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sensitive to the other regions’ emission reduction (k is large) or if the emissions E
of economy 1 are relatively large, optimal emission reduction of region 1 would
increase compared to the case without leakage.
The first order condition for cooperative behaviour is, for player 1
2α1Y1R1 + χ1Y1 − 0.5χ2Y2 − 0.5χ3Y3 −
(γ1Y1 + γ2Y2 + γ3Y3)[(1 + k1)E1 − 0.5k2E2 − 0.5k3E3] = 0 ⇔ R1 =
(γ1Y1 + γ2Y2 + γ3Y3)[(1 + k1)E1 − 0.5k2E2 − 0.5k3E3] − χ1Y1 + 0.5χ2Y2 + 0.5χ3Y3
2α1Y1
. (24)
In the second formulation, the first order conditions for non-cooperative behaviour
are, for player 1
(1 0 0)


1 − β1Y1
Y2 + Y3 −
β1Y1
Y2 + Y3
− β2Y2
Y1 + Y3 1 −
β2Y2
Y1 + Y3
− β3Y3
Y1 + Y2 −
β3Y3
Y1 + Y2 1


−1

 2α1R1Y10
0

−
(1 0 0)


γ1Y1[(1 + k1)E1 − 0.5k2E2 − 0.5k3E3]
γ2Y2[(1 + k2)E2 − 0.5k1E1 − 0.5k3E3]
γ3Y3[(1 + k3)E3 − 0.5k1E1 − 0.5k2E2]

 = 0. (25)
The first order conditions for cooperative behaviour are, for emission reductions
by player 1
(1 1 1)


1 − β1Y1
Y2 + Y3 −
β1Y1
Y2 + Y3
− β2Y2
Y1 + Y3 1 −
β2Y2
Y1 + Y3
− β3Y3
Y1 + Y2 −
β3Y3
Y1 + Y2 1


−1

 2α1R1Y10
0

−
(1 1 1)


γ1Y1[(1 + k1)E1 − 0.5k2E2 − 0.5k3E3]
γ2Y2[(1 + k2)E2 − 0.5k1E1 − 0.5k3E3]
γ3Y3[(1 + k3)E3 − 0.5k1E1 − 0.5k2E2]

 = 0. (26)
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4.4. LEAKAGE: RESULTS
Table VI shows results of the two models presented above. The parameters are the
same as above (central estimates only). We assume a leakage of 10%, with 5% and
15% as sensitivity analysis. Table VII provides a summary.
Without trade interactions, the grand coalition nor any of the three possible
coalitions of two players is internally stable. That is, in each coalition, there is one
player that is better of in the non-cooperative case and thus has an incentive to leave
the coalition. This conclusion holds for the best guess as well as for the sensitivity
analyses. The only qualitative difference with the case without leakage is that the
coalition between the USA and EU15 is no longer internally stable.
In our first representation of trade interactions, the grand coalition is in the
γ -core, that is, all players are better off with full cooperation that with non-
cooperation. The grand coalition, however, is internally instable, using the myopic
stability criterion of Carraro (1997): The EU15 is better of if it plays as a singleton,
and the USA and JPN form a coalition. The USA and JPN are better off in a
coalition than as singletons, so the grand coalition is also internally instable using
the far-sighted stability criterion of Chwe (1994).
In our second representation of trade interaction, the grand coalition nor any of
the three possible coalitions of two players is internally stable. This holds for the
best guess as well as for the sensitivity analysis.
In our formulation, leakage alters the strategic interests of the players, even
though, in the chosen representation, leakage does not alter relative and marginal
abatement costs. However, leakage does alter the effectiveness of emission reduc-
tion.
5. Conclusion
A number of conclusions emerge from the analyses in this paper. These conclu-
sions are reached on the basis of admittedly simple representations of complex
interactions.
It matters what drives international spillover effects. If spillover effects are
mostly determined by the total costs of other countries’ emission reduction efforts
(or by the absolute emission reduction abroad – the size effects), the incentives to
cooperate are about as weak as if there were no spillovers whatsoever. Much as
a country would like other countries to take spillover effects into account, it does
not want to do so itself. In our specification, for a wide range of parameters, the
two effects largely cancel – actually, cooperation becomes a little harder, a hardly
noticeable effect as cooperation was already virtually absent in the no-trade case.
However, if spillover effects are mostly driven by relative emission reduc-
tions (the terms-of-trade effects), incentives to cooperate are stronger than without
considering spillovers. The intuition behind this result is that the interdependence
between countries’ emission reduction policies is stronger so that international
coordination has a higher pay-off.
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Table VI. Optimal emission reduction and pay-off with leakagea
Reduction (percent) Pay-off (million dollar)
USA EU15 JPN USA EU15 JPN
No cooperation
NT 7.3 5.0 3.5 25.0 31.5 36.2
(7.1–7.5) (4.9–5.0) (2.9–4.1) (24.6–25.4) (31.4–31.6) (35.7–36.8)
T1 1.1 6.6 2.4 30.2 14.5 20.3
(0.9–1.4) (6.5–6.6) (1.8–3.1) (28.9–31.6) (13.9–15.1) (19.4–21.1)
T2 5.4 5.6 3.3 19.7 27.4 31.1
(5.3–5.5) (5.6–5.6) (2.8–3.9) (19.4–20.0) (27.3–27.4) (30.2–31.4)
Full cooperation
NT 22.0 14.9 10.5 1.8 60.1 102.7
(21.4–22.5) (14.8–15.0) (8.7–12.3) (–3.1–6.6) (60.0–60.2) (98.8–106.1)
T1 22.1 18.5 16.0 37.4 34.9 105.5
(21.3–22.9) (18.4–18.5) (14.1–17.9) (28.0–46.6) (33.7–36.1) (98.7–111.7)
T2 11.4 9.8 29.7 0.5 81.5 3.9
(11.4–11.4) (9.8–9.8) (29.7–29.7) (0.5–0.5) (81.5–81.5) (3.9–3.9)
Coalition of USA and EU15
NT 14.6 10.0 3.5 22.9 48.9 70.8
(14.3–15.0) (9.9–10.0) (2.9–4.1) (21.3–24.5) (48.3–49.4) (69.6–72.0)
T1 10.5 13.8 2.4 43.2 24.9 68.2
(10.0–11.1) (13.8–13.9) (1.8–3.1) (40.3–46.0) (23.8–26.0) (66.3–70.0)
T2 10.2 8.8 3.3 14.2 43.6 52.8
(10.2–10.2) (8.8–8.8) (2.8–3.9) (13.9–14.5) (43.1–44.1) (52.6–52.9)
Coalition of USA and JPN
NT 14.6 5.0 7.0 14.3 57.5 59.2
(14.3–15.0) (4.9–5.0) (5.8–8.2) (12.2–16.4) (57.2–57.7) (57.4–60.7)
T1 10.5 6.6 15.9 46.2 41.9 39.6
(10.0–11.1) (6.5–6.6) (14.6–17.1) (41.8–50.5) (40.7–43.1) (35.2–43.7)
T2 6.3 5.6 16.3 20.5 44.7 21.8
(6.3–6.3) (5.6–5.6) (16.3–16.3) (20.5–20.6) (44.7–44.7) (21.7–21.9)
Coalition of EU15 and JPN
NT 7.3 10.0 7.0 39.1 28.3 47.2
(7.1–7.5) (9.9–10.0) (5.8–8.2) (38.3–39.8) (27.8–28.8) (46.0–48.3)
T1 1.1 11.2 2.6 47.9 8.9 31.2
(0.9–1.4) (11.1–11.2) (1.3–3.8) (45.2–50.6) (8.6–9.2) (30.3–31.9)
T2 6.3 7.2 21.7 19.0 51.7 11.6
(6.3–6.3) (7.2–7.2) (21.7–21.7) (19.0–19.0) (51.7–51.7) (11.6–11.6)
aThe range of emission reduction efforts and pay-offs are given in brackets. These ranges are found
by varying the parameters by one standard deviation.
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Table VII. Stable coalitions with leakagea
NT T1 T2
Internally stable coalitions Ø {USA, EU15}, Ø
{USA, JPN}
Externally stable coalitionsa {EU15, JPN} {USA, JPN} {USA, EU15},
{EU15, JPN}
Stable coalitions Ø {USA, JPN} Ø
aSee the footnotes to Table V.
Leakage changes the numbers but not the qualitative insights. The intuition is
straightforward. On the one hand, leakage means that a country has less control
over its own emissions. On the other hand, with leakage, a country has some control
over other countries’ emissions. Essentially, leakage implies that a country has
control over different base emissions. Leakage thus changes the relative importance
of countries, but not their incentives to abate or cooperate.
Clearly, the analysis in this paper is only a small step, and our understanding
is far away from where we would like it to be. The most obvious shortcoming
is that we use a static analysis for a dynamic problem. The functional forms are
not as generic as can be, and the number of players is limited. Furthermore, the
analysis should be extended to more linkages (e.g., technology) and to other issues
(e.g., conventional air pollution). Finally, for lack of observations of the effects of
greenhouse gas emission reduction policies, we had to rely on “simulated data”. All
that is deferred to future research. For the moment, we conclude that international
trade and carbon leakage are important considerations in the choice how much
greenhouse gas emissions to reduce and whether and with whom to cooperate.
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Notes
1. Some may argue that h = 0. We separately analyse that case below.
2. Note that the costs of emission reduction are a function of leakage if emission reduction is
expressed as absolute emission reduction, or as emission reduction relative to a fixed base year, or
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as emission reduction relative to a base line that includes leakage. However, we express emission
reduction relative to a base line excluding leakage.
3. The assumption is that the moved economic activity uses the exact same technology in the host
country as it did in the origin country. A priori, there is little reason to assume that the technology
would be more or less emission-intensive.
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